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Ten days now after 11 September, the policy agenda becomes a huge set of interlocking
issues – political, strategic, economic. The present note makes a first survey of these issues,
and expresses opinions on some of them. However the main purpose is to establish a template
or framework to help monitor and evaluate the evolution of the world’s response to this
massive event. It will be updated and revised in further CEPS Policy Briefs as the story
unfolds.  
Summary assessment to date 
(A) Politics and security. Alliance building and careful calibration of the nature of the riposte
seems to be proceeding well. Early concerns that Pentagon hawks wanted to attack many
states more or less connected with Bin Laden activities in the past seems to have given
way to the choice of a tightly targeted military riposte hitting Afghanistan, alongside as
extensive as possible alliance building elsewhere in the Arab/Islamic world, as well as of
course Europe including Russia. Such a strategy is definitely that desired by Europe.
(B) Economics. There is at least a technical recession to confront in the US and at least an
interruption of growth in the EU. However policy makers in both the US and EU, both
monetary and fiscal, are reacting promptly with countercyclical policy. This should work,
notably since there is little reason to expect that 11 September has altered the medium run
outlook for the world economy.
1. This was indeed a defining moment, the first post-modern war
1 
It was more than just a terrorist act, but not an inter-state war, yet one in which the world’s
only superpower revealed a colossal vulnerability. The spectre of nuclear or biological
warfare terrorism becomes more vividly plausible. But, as Solana stressed before the
European Parliament on 19 September, this is neither a crusade nor a war against Islam nor
against the Arab world.
2. What kind of riposte? 
The US prepares to take the major initiative, especially militarily. The EU joins in as ally over
a wide range of options, and is progressively defining its position in a fast-moving situation.
The menu for the riposte may look like this:
a) counter-attacks of varying intensity and breadth
-  ultimatum to host state for extradition of the prime suspect and dismantlement of terrorist
facilities (which is what President Bush demanded in his speech to Congress on 20
September);
-  cruise missile attacks on terrorist targets; and/or by special commando forces;
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-  wider terms of reference for counter-intelligence, including authorisation of political
assassination (“wanted dead or alive”);
-  support for surrogate opposition forces in selected places;
-  punitive attacks on ‘non-cooperative’ states;
2
b) protective measures
-  increased police and intelligence cooperation;
-  tightening of travel and domestic security arrangements/standards;
-  tightening up on international financial assets of suspect parties;
c) diplomatic-strategic
-  new international alliance to combat terrorism, including Russia as well as NATO, with a
mutli-faceted long-term action;
-  renewed efforts to secure peace between Israel and Palestine;
-  recourse to UN, renewed interest (on US side?) in global multilateralism. 
Put in more general policy terms, there is the choice of strategy between two types: on the one
hand unidirectional policies of counterattack of varying intensity and breadth, and, on the
other hand, deliberate policy mixes, which also bring in measures to remove or lessen
fundamental sources of conflict (viz. peace process and political negotiations in Middle East),
so to avoid above all a Huntington-type confrontation between the West and the Arab/Islamic
world. The EU and especially its NATO members, as the main allies of the US, participate
now in a policy dialogue to try to identify the most effective reaction, hopefully with a shared
discipline to avoid an excessively hasty riposte which might not well calculate the risks of
counter-productive results.
As regards the present state of thinking in the inner sanctum of US policy makers, there is
only limited information issued to the public. Of course the military are put onto a state of
readiness to execute a wide range of options. Visible displays of military preparations (aircraft
carrier movements, pre-positioning of fuelling capabilites for the air force etc.) are serving
also as muscle-flexing messages to US public opinion
3 and to wavering states. Washington
must be examining a wide menu of options. It may be having an argument over the
recommended riposte (viz. public exchanges between Powell and Rumsfeld/Wolfowitz)
4.
President Bush’s ultimatum speech of 20 September seems to point to a concentrated attack
on Afghanistan as the most likely next step.  European assessments favour preparation of a
maximum international coalition and indeed alliance to combat international terrorism, and
minimisation of the risks of increasing polarisation between the West and Arab/Islamic world.
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This view would restrain military intervention to the most demonstrable terrorist targets, and
maximise the build-up of international civilian ‘policing action’ (to use this term in a wide
sense, covering intelligence services, judicial and regulatory systems, special counter-terrorist
units etc.).
3. Role of NATO
Paradoxically this first possible recourse to NATO’s Article 5 collective defence provision
(an attack on one ally is an attack on all) is for a conflict of a type completely different to that
originally intended. The debate on how far Article 5 is open for anti-terrorist actions has been
ongoing in NATO for some time. For example the 1999 Washington Summit saw Europeans
decline a US request to be explicit on this point, and the language adopted in its new Strategic
Concept document was indirect: “Alliance security can be affected by other risks of a wider
nature, including acts of terrorism”. While NATO seems to have agreed in the immediate
aftermath of 11 September on the acceptability in principle of a US request to invoke Article
5, if the attack is found to have come from abroad, the debate about what this means for the
non-military roles of NATO seems only to have begun.  
4. New situation for defence doctrines and spending priorities 
For the US, just as the missile defence debate has got under way, and with the advancing
military revolution for high-tech zero-casualty war and minimal deployment of conventional
forces, the outlook now looks very different. Limited missile defence (against modest rogue
state rockets) looks now all the more relevant, but huge investments in strategic missile
defence looks all the more questionable, alongside the new priority needs. The implications
for European military doctrines and priorities will be different, because of lesser investment in
these US-type programmes, but nonetheless extensive.
5. New alliances 
The old NATO alliance is being mobilised and validated in a new context. However there
openings for a new US-Russian rapprochement, given Russia’s engagement in Central Asia
with its Tashkent Treaty allies to defend against Afghanistan-based terrorism. Also we hear
that Moscow has already begun to change its view of ESDP, giving up the hope of it
becoming a wedge between the US and EU, understanding that the EU won’t play this game,
and that a trilateral cooperation US-EU-Russia is the only relevant scenario.
5 With an US-
Russia rapprochement over international terrorism, the US-EU-Russia triangular cooperation
could receive a real boost, with a more positive context within which to handle the NATO
enlargement process in a more harmonious way. In addition there is the possibility to bring
China into something of a new security alliance, mitigating US-Chinese tensions over other
security issues (especially of course if strategic missile defence priorities were lowered). A
global summit to concert on counter-terrorism policy is already being advocated, maybe not
yet a first G-9 (G-8 plus China), but the idea gets aired.
However in Russia political debate turns in favour of specific terms for a new cooperation
with the US over combatting terrorism. Russian Realpolitik inclinations are manifest. Various
political personalities and commentators are making the following points:
6 a/ Russia should
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now solve the Chechen question, dropping negotiation and using force alone, and without
international criticism; b/ Russia should take the occasion to re-establish firmer control over
Central Asia and the Caucasus more generally. In this situation the position of Uzbekistan
becomes particulary important. It is the most populous state of the region, and vulnerable to a
militant Islamic challenge to its autocratic and repressive regime.
7 It declares that it is “open
for discussion” about the possible use of its air space or military bases by the US, whereas
Russia has declared its opposition to such an eventuality.
8 This is a further pointer to the
likelihood of difficult trade-offs ahead between security and human rights agendas.
6. Israel-Palestine 
Here there are huge risks and opportunities. The risk is that the Sharon government and US
pro-Israel factions will see a moral case and political opportunity to hit Palestinian targets
even harder and indiscriminately. This would lead straight into the most alarming escalation
scenario for Arab/Islamic-Western relations. The opportunity, if the Palestinians are shown to
be basically clean on the 11 September attack, is for the peace process to be relaunched, given
also how close to agreement the parties actually got at Taba in December. The most recent
developments are positive, to the extent that Arafat has ordered a cease-fire, and on 18
September Israel has ordered also a stand-off by its forces. The possibility of a Peres-Arafat
meeting is under intense discussion. However the politics of both Palestine and the Israel
coalition government remain extremely tense and precarious. The EU and US, reportedly,
have been pushing both parties to take the new situation as an opportunity for de-escalating
recent hostilities, and eventually renewing the peace process.
7. Turkey 
The need to get EU-Turkish relations on a sound track is even more acute in the new
situation, as a front-line state in relation to areas of Islamic militancy. Here also the outlook is
for the moment bad, with grave instability in Turkey both economically and politically, the
NATO/ESDP impasse unsolved, and the Cyprus question coming fast up on the horizon as a
factor of crisis with the EU in 2002. It is therefore so important that there be a closing of the
ranks in Turkey-EU-US-NATO  relations. But analogous to the Israel case, Turkey should not
be encouraged to think that it should now ‘deal with’ its Kurdish problems without regard to
legitimate grievances and human rights criteria.
The economic plight of Turkey, in this new political situation, now makes the case for a
package deal of strategic dimensions compelling.  The Turkish economy will not survive long
with interest rates at close to 100 % while inflation remains at 30-40%.  One of the two has to
give.  Malpractice and corruption in the banking system is also staggering,  but under the
present combination of sky-high real interest rates and a recession even honest credits start to
look doubtful as more and more enterprises go bankrupt. Most of these problems could
eliminated through an economic package consisting of : a) replacement of the Turkish lira by
the euro, b) privatisation of the banking system and c) adoption of the Maastricht rules for
fiscal policy.  Of course a radical measure such as euro-isation would have politically to be a
sovereign unilateral choice by Turkey (finance minister Dervis has shown interest in the idea,
not surprisingly since the standard IMF support measures have not worked). The whole
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package hypothesised – euro-isation, bank reform and Maastricht budget rules - would
transform the political equilibrium inside the country strengthening the ‘Western’ element,
which seeks to anchor the country to the EU. The dispute over NATO assets and ESDP would
be quickly resolved, and in a new climate of fundamental solidarity between the EU and
Turkey the Cyprus question could be taken up again with a common resolve to find a solution
for the whole of Cyprus soon to enter the EU as full member state. 
8. EU ‘Borderland Europe’ policies 
There will surely be pressures to tighten up on Schengen and EU policies on the movement of
persons. But this leads into the larger question of EU’s  ‘Borderland Europe’ policies, i.e.
those policies that relate the enlarging EU to its neighbours. There are two possible
tendencies: A) Fortress Europe, or ‘keep them out’; and B) Inclusive Europe, which seeks
cooperative and stabilising systems for the EU relations with the non-accession candidate
states (stability pacts, cooperative regional dimensions, virtual membership arrangements,
protectorate regimes). Many political voices may cry out for more of a Fortress Europe, with
the counter-terrorism argument reinforcing the already strong asylum and immigration-
defences arguments. However the counter-argument is that only ‘inclusive’ policies by the
EU towards its neighbours can supply fundamental security over its borders. Moreover, the
‘post-modern’ enemy knows no frontiers (as the recent example of IRA terrorists helping the
Colombian drug barons shows).  
9. EU Rapid Reaction Capability 
This is already taking shape at the planning stage, with open questions regarding the precise
scenarios that it should be equipped to address. The counter-terrorism capabilities will surely
be promoted in the priority listings, with more urgency and resources devoted to relevant
intelligence facilities and specialised counter-terrorist units. In general a renewed political
boost for this slowly emerging EU military capability is called for.
10. EU Justice and Home Affairs 
Development of civilian capabilities should be given high priority, with the possibility now to
build on recent developments such as the Schengen Information System and Europol. There
are further projects currently being prepared such as the civilian Rapid Reaction Capability
for deploying police forces into lawless parts of the European neighbourhood,  new proposals
for a European Public Prosecutor, the ‘Eurojust’ idea for judicial cooperation and mutual
recognition in matters of criminal law, and a European Border Guard. 
The Commission published proposals on 19 September for a common definition of terrorism,
which is a starting point and prerequisite for developing more comprehensive legal base and
policies for combatting terrorism in the Europe. It is also proposed to establish a ‘European
arrest warrant’, relying on the mutual recoginition principle and replacing cumbersome
extradition procedures. EU finance ministers are working on the implementation of a money-
laundering directive. 
11. US macroeconomics 
The attack came at a time when the US economy was already on a tightrope. Before 11
September, there was still no end in sight to the collapse of investment. The key question was
whether consumers would continue to underpin demand.  It now seems clear that there will at
least by a technical recession. Due to the disruption of trade and commerce GDP is likely to
have contracted in the third quarter. But this could be the prelude to a V-shaped recovery, ifEMERSON & GROS
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confidence can be reasonably restored, with powerful stimuli from fiscal and monetary policy
able to work properly. The key to a recovery would thus be maintaining the confidence (and
therefore spending power) of the US consumer, who is responsible for about 70% of overall
demand.  The first signs are encouraging in that the latest survey, with some input after the
attack, actually shows a small improvement in consumer sentiment. US financial markets,
which panicked after the Russia/LTC crisis in 1998, seems to have been little affected.  The
mark-down of asset prices has been limited, there is no shortage of liquidity and there are no
signs of market dysfunctions as in 1998 (the spread between on-the-run and off-the-run US
Treasury bills has not widened).  
The US monetary policy response has been swift and convincing, supported also by ‘virtual’
co-ordination internationally.  There can be little doubt that the FED will undertake further
steps if deemed necessary.  Fiscal policy will also become quickly expansionary in the US
due to re-construction aid and increased military spending. Both monetary and fiscal policy
will become more expansionary than would normally have been justified by the state of the
economy, because US policy makers no doubt feel that ‘we cannot give the terrorists the
satisfaction to have pushed us into recession’.
12. European macroeconomics 
Since in Europe the investment boom was weaker than in the US, the bust is also likely to be
more limited. Growth may be somewhat below the meagre EU potential, but there is no
reason to expect a full-blown recession. Monetary policy is likely to remain cautiously
expansionary, now that inflation is declining and the automatic stabilisers will be invoked to
allow a modest expansion of fiscal deficits. Confidence in the ECB has increased
considerably after it showed on 17 September that it also, like the FED, can act quickly when
needed and cut interest rates decisively. Prior to the attack the main issue had been whether it
would be appropriate to let the automatic stabilisers work in the current slow-down and thus
allow deficits to widen temporarily. There was considerable opposition to this because the
large member countries still do not have the equilibrium on a cyclically adjusted basis that
would is called for under the Stability Pact.  However the European Council (late on 21
September) has overriden such concerns of some finance ministers and the Commission
(witnessed at their meeting a few hours earlier) for the time being, with deficits to be allowed
to increase somewhat, thus making fiscal policy also mildly expansionary. 
The international spillover effects should also be limited. The value of the dollar could go
either way. An expansionary fiscal policy in theb US is likely to strengthen the dollar, but an
aggressive easing of monetary policy might have the opposite effect.  As one does not know
yet whether the FED will have to lower rates even more to calm markets it is difficult to know
what the net effect is going to be.  But whichever way it goes, it cannot be very large as the
attack will not affect the longer term outlook for the US economy.  However, any outlook for
the dollar must come with the health warning that it cannot stay strong forever, for the simple
reason that the US current account deficit cannot go on forever at 4% of GDP. But this has
been known for some time. Could this event pierce the dollar bubble?  This is unlikely to
happen in the immediate future. Over the next weeks the FED and the ECB will certainly act
to contain any turbulence in the foreign exchange markets.
All in all there is at least a technical recession confront in the US and at least an interruption
of growth in the EU. However policy makers in both the US and EU, both monetary and
fiscal, are reacting promptly with countercyclical policy. This should work, notably since
there is little reason to expect that 11 September has altered the medium run outlook for the
world economy.  Emerging markets will have to pay a higher risk premium. But given theISSUES FOR EUROPE – POST-11 SEPTEMBER
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need to maintain a global alliance against terrorists the US will be much more willing to
prevent key countries from falling into a black hole.
13. Oil  
This relatively benign economic outlook demands a stable oil price.  This in turn depends  on
the US political-military response and whether it will antagonise the Gulf states. So far the
markets have taken the position that this is unlikely to happen. The spot and future prices for
oil have barely moved. However this interlocking set of conditions is essential, which returns
to the crucial question of the political-military riposte already discussed. 
14. European Council 
An emergency meeting met in the evening of 21 September to give political orientations for
EU strategy. Beyond declarations of poltical solidarity for the US, three points are notable
about the communique: 
i)  A US military riposte is judged legitimate on the basis of UN Security Council
Resolution 1368, and member states are prepared to support such actions “each
according to its means”. 
ii)  There is large support for the work of Justice and Home Affairs ministers to execute
the proposals summarised above. 
iii)  On countercyclical policy, it is said unequivocally that budgetary automatic stabilisers
should be allowed to come into play.ABOUT CEPS
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